This Notepad++ breach really highlights how much leverage attackers get by hitting the update chain itself instead of individual targets. Supply chain attacks are basically force multipliers where one compromise scales to thousands of organizations instantly. I've seen firsthand how even sanitized dev environments can miss these when the signature validation gets lazy or someone skips SBOM checks under time pressue. Feels like we're at the point where every update pipeline needs the sametreatment as prod infrastructure cause its basically a direct route into everyone's stack.
This Notepad++ breach really highlights how much leverage attackers get by hitting the update chain itself instead of individual targets. Supply chain attacks are basically force multipliers where one compromise scales to thousands of organizations instantly. I've seen firsthand how even sanitized dev environments can miss these when the signature validation gets lazy or someone skips SBOM checks under time pressue. Feels like we're at the point where every update pipeline needs the sametreatment as prod infrastructure cause its basically a direct route into everyone's stack.